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The amygdala has received intense recent attention from neuroscientists investigating its function at the molecular,
cellular, systems, cognitive, and clinical level. It clearly contributes to processing emotionally and socially relevant
information, yet a unifying description and computational account have been lacking. The difficulty of tying together
thevarious studies stems inpart fromthe sheerdiversityof approachesandspecies studied, inpart fromtheamygdala’s
inherent heterogeneity in terms of its component nuclei, and in part because different investigators have simply
been interested in different topics. Yet, a synthesis now seems close at hand in combining new results from social
neuroscience with data from neuroeconomics and reward learning. The amygdala processes a psychological stimulus
dimension related to saliency or relevance; mechanisms have been identified to link it to processing unpredictability;
and insights from reward learning have situated it within a network of structures that include the prefrontal cortex
and the ventral striatum in processing the current value of stimuli. These aspects help to clarify the amygdala’s
contributions to recognizing emotion from faces, to social behavior toward conspecifics, and to reward learning and
instrumental behavior.
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Introduction
Work on the amygdala is fractured into several do-
mains, and relating these in a consistent account of
amygdala function is not straightforward. In terms
of functional topics, one can identify three broad
themes: social behavior, emotion, and reward learn-
ing. The classic studies by Kluver and Bucy (in the
1930s), and before them Brown and Schafer (in
the 1880s), perhaps emphasized mostly the first, al-
though they were also relevant for the second and
third. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw an explo-
sion of work on emotion, in particular in relation
to the processing of facial expressions. And earlier
work on issues related to reward learning has now
led to a host of studies using single-unit electro-
physiology in animals as well as fMRI in humans.
Complementing the diversity of functional topics
is a diversity of species in which the amygdala has
been investigated. Until about 1994 this was almost
exclusively research conducted in rodents, with a
small number of laboratories tackling the challenge
of work in monkeys. Although that work has con-
tinued (and indeed is thriving), it has been to some
extent overshadowed by a plethora of fMRI studies
in humans, many investigating psychiatric illness.
At the outset it is important to keep in mind that
the amygdala is a complex collection of 13 nuclei
in primates1 (indeed, there has been some contro-
versy about the concept of “the amygdala” as a single
entity2) (Fig. 1). These are typically distinguished in
studies in nonhuman animals, but rarely in humans
because of the limited spatial resolution afforded
by techniques commonly used, such as fMRI (see
Box 1). The amygdala is extensively connected with
many other cortical and subcortical structures, and
so accounts of its function will need to do justice
to its location in this dense web of connections.
Finally, it has become apparent that there are sub-
stantial individual differences in the amygdala (the
extremes of which may contribute to many psy-
chiatric illnesses), as well as substantial effects of
context and stimulus history, all of which makes it
essential to look at individual and trial-wise details
which can get obscured in group-level effects and
meta-analyses.
doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05445.x
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Figure 1. The amygdala and its nuclei. On the left is a Nissl stain, which stains cell bodies, and a silver stain that
stains fibers coursing through the amygdala, showing the rat amygdala. On the right are a coronal and parasaggital
MRI scan onto which probabilistic locations of amygdala nuclei in humans have been mapped. From Refs. 87 and
137. Abbreviations of amygdala areas: AB, accessory basal; B, basal nucleus; Ce, central nucleus; itc, intercalated cells;
La, lateral nucleus; M, medial nucleus; CO, cortical nucleus. Nonamygdala areas: AST, amygdalo-striatal transition
area; CPu, caudate putamen; CTX, cortex. Copyright acknowledgment: two lefthand panels: reproduced from Ref.
87 with permission from Elsevier; two righthand panels: reproduced from Ref. 137 with permission from Springer
Science+Business Media.
Some disclaimers are in order to help circum-
scribe this review, because one could easily write a
book on the amygdala (and several have been writ-
ten3,4). First, the focus will be on social-emotional
functions of the amygdala in primates with an em-
phasis on humans. Second, I will not review the
amygdala’s role in psychiatric illness here, although
Box 1: BOLD fMRI of the amygdala
By far the largest number of studies on the hu-
man amygdala use BOLD fMRI as the approach.
Although this is revealing a wealth of data and is
certain to continue to constitute the method of
choice for practical reasons at least for the next
several years, it is worth reiterating the caveats as-
sociated with BOLD fMRI. Aside from the flurry
of recent attention to concerns about statistical re-
liability and generalizability,135,136 all of which can
be addressed in studies cognizant of these caveats,
there are technical difficulties in obtaining and lo-
calizing signal in and around the amygdala due to
susceptibility artifacts. Optimized imaging param-
eters have largely solved theproblemofweak signal,
and many researchers now obtain B0 field maps
to correct for geometric distortion. Another tricky
issue is that BOLD responses to particular psycho-
logical or objective stimulus dimensions may be
nonlinear—for instance, nonlinear responses have
been noted both to trustworthiness in faces64 as
well as to valence in odorants.70 A more
insights into its functional role from the studies
discussed earlier are of course highly relevant for
understanding psychiatric illnesses as well, rang-
ing from mood disorders to autism. Third, I will
highlight lesion studies together with some elec-
trophysiological studies while minimizing review
of functional imaging studies (which have been
fundamental limitation is the spatial resolution
of BOLD fMRI together with individual varia-
tions in amygdala morphometry, limiting conclu-
sions about exact boundaries and nuclei within
the amygdala to probabilistic statements.137 Even
worse is the issue of temporal resolution as we
noted earlier, because this definitely conflates a
number of distinct processes that occur on the
timescale of a few milliseconds rather than the
seconds of BOLD signal integration. Perhaps the
most worrisome aspect of BOLD fMRI concerns
its physiological basis. Not only is the hemody-
namic response function in the amygdala rather
different in shape than what is found in cortex,
but as with all BOLD fMRI, it remains uncertain
what precisely is driving the observed signal. Pos-
sibilities range from inputs from distal targets to
intrinsic processing to little neuronal activity at all
and mere distal regulation of hemodynamics.138
While researchers are acutely aware of these issues
and more, it remains the case that definitive find-
ings will require convergent results from multiple
approaches—ideally electrophysiology, fMRI, and
lesion studies.
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reviewed to some extent elsewhere5,6). Finally, stud-
ies reviewed and citations will emphasize the most
recent work, following the theme of this book
series.
Lesion studies of social behavior in
monkeys
Kluver and Bucy’s classic studies in the 1930s de-
scribed the behavioral consequences of large bitem-
poral lesions in monkeys,7,8 which included a
propensity to shift rapidly in exploring different ob-
jects (“hypermetamorphosis”), to approach, ingest,
and mount many stimuli indiscriminately, and to
show a profound lack of behavioral regulation on
the basis of the emotional and social meaning of
stimuli (“psychic blindness”). Monkeys with such
lesions were not blind or deaf—they just no longer
had access to the value of what they saw and heard.9
A well-known shortcoming of these early experi-
ments was the nonselectivity of the lesions, which
included not only the entire medial temporal lobe
but also substantial portions of lateral and posterior
temporal cortex as well as subjacent white matter,
making it impossible to assign the deficits specifi-
cally to the amygdala. Nonetheless, their observa-
tions set the stage for subsequent work using more
selective aspiration10 and pharmacological lesions
of the amygdala.11–14 Current lesion studies favor
lesions made by injecting the drug ibotenic acid, a
neurotoxinwhich can be quite selective for neurons,
sparing both fibers of passage as well as surrounding
structures if the injection is sufficiently focal (typi-
cally verified by structural MRI). Reversible lesions
can also be made by injecting drugs such as mus-
cimol, a GABA-A receptor agonist that temporarily
silences the electrical activity of neurons through in-
hibition. The advent of optogeneticmethods will no
doubt lead to a large number of studies examining
the reversible activation and inactivation of specific
neuronal sub-populations in the amygdala in the
very near future.15 The studies so far have gener-
ally revealed a subset of the full-blown Kluver–Bucy
syndrome, the subset becoming more restricted the
more selective the lesions. This likely arises from
the fact that many of the structures proximal to the
amygdala, such as perirhinal and entorhinal cortices
and temporal polar cortex, also participate in social
behaviors to some extent. When the amygdala is
more selectively lesioned, there is disproportionate
impairment inparticular in thenormal cautiousness
and distrust with whichmonkeys approach novel or
frightening objects, or people. For instance, mon-
keys with amygdala lesions show less caution in ap-
proaching potential predators like snakes to which
they normally have an innate fear response14 and
show less initial avoidance of human strangers.12
These behaviors are especially notable in circum-
stances of novelty and unfamiliarity, where healthy
monkeys typically exercise substantial caution in ap-
proaching unknown objects or unfamiliar people—
an issue we will return to when discussing in-
sights obtained from functional imaging and lesion
studies in humans that are pointing toward a role
for the amygdala in processing unpredictability or
ambiguity.
The behavior of amygdalectomized monkeys to-
ward other monkeys is more complex to quantify,
due to the reciprocity of the social interaction. Ear-
lier lesions that were nonselective resulted in se-
vere impairments in social behavior with the re-
sult that the monkeys lost their social status16 and
were ostracized by the group, resulting in death in
the wild.17 Selective neurotoxic lesions resulted in
more subtle impairments that were quite complex
and depended on other factors. One study found
that the amygdalectomized monkeys showed more
prosocial cues and less avoidance behaviors toward
other (healthy) monkeys when in dyadic interac-
tions, with the result that they were actually ap-
proached more and groomed more by other mon-
keys.11 They also showed more approach behavior
toward unfamiliar humans, consistent with their
increase in prosocial behaviors (Fig. 2). However,
in more complex groups (the lesioned monkey to-
gether with three healthy monkeys in a tetrad) these
effects were not seen, and instead a quite subtle in-
crease in avoidance and stress behaviors was shown
by other monkeys toward the amygdalectomized
monkey.13 Further complexities arise if the lesions
are made neonatally: for instance, exaggerated so-
cial fear (yet with the typically diminished fear of
novel objects) has been reported in such lesioned
monkeys,18 although this profile appears to change
as the monkeys age.19
Two important take-home messages from the
monkey lesion studies are that the amygdala’s ef-
fect on social behavior is not rigid and universal,
but context dependent and susceptible to individ-
ual differences; and that even complete lesions of
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Figure 2. Social approach behavior following amygdala lesions. (A): Monkeys with amygdala lesions show less fear
towards predators and less timidity towards humans.Onemeasure quantifying this is that they spendmore time at the
front of the cage when there is an unfamiliar person standing there. (B): Approach behavior in patient SM (red bar)
compared to control subjects (purple bars) in relation to the experimenter (black bar). Whereas SM had a preferred
interpersonal distance of 0.34 meters (C), controls had a distance of 0.64 meters (D). Copyright acknowledgment: A:
reproduced from Ref. 12 with permission from the American Psychological Association; (B-D): modified from Ref.
37 with permission from Nature Publishing Group.
the amygdala appear to leave the repertoire of so-
cial behaviors as such largely intact—they just are
not elicited in a context-appropriate way.20 For in-
stance, monkeys with amygdala lesions can still re-
spond normally to social stimuli such as a human
stare, even though they show blunted avoidance re-
sponses to potential predators such as a snake.14
Although the socioemotional changes in monkeys
with amygdala lesions appear to constitute a stable
behavioral change that can be thought of as a trait
change in personality,12 it is neither a change in the
ability to show the full repertoire of social behav-
iors20 nor a change in mood as such.21 Rather, it
is probably best thought of as a consistent change
in the way that context-dependent situations (stim-
uli in the context of an emotionally significant or
socially significant setting) modulate motivated be-
havior. Part of the complexity in accounting for the
amygdala’s effects on social behavior, and the rea-
son for the rather nuanced explanation just offered,
will become more apparent in the sections later:
they arise from the fact that the amygdala is con-
nected to a host of other structureswhose function it
modulates.
Lesion studies of social behavior
in humans
Several etiologies can produce amygdala lesions in
humans. Probably the most common is epilepsy,
which can result in medial temporal sclerosis if se-
vere and untreated. More relevant for the present
review, medically refractory epilepsy is occasionally
treated neurosurgically, by ablation of parts of the
medial temporal lobe on one side. The late famous
patient HM had bilateral medial temporal lobe le-
sions, including bilateral lesions of the amygdala,
for the treatment of epilepsy with the consequence
that he became severely amnesic due to his bilat-
eral hippocampal damage. Nowadays, the surgery
is essentially always unilateral and involves variable
extents of resection of the hippocampus, the amyg-
dala, and surroundingmedial temporal and tempo-
ral polar cortices. The consequences of such lesions
on social cognition are impossible to attribute selec-
tively to the amygdala, although they are likely due
in good part to amygdala damage because they bear
some resemblance to what is observed following se-
lective amygdala lesions (e.g ., impaired Pavlovian
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Figure 3. The brain and face processing of patient SM. Bilateral amygdala lesions impair the use of the eyes and gaze
to the eyes during emotion judgment. (A) A patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala made significantly less
use of information from the eye region of faces when judging emotion. (B) While looking at whole faces, the patient
(right column of images) exhibited abnormal face gaze, making far fewer fixations to the eyes than did controls (left
column of images). This was observed across emotions (free viewing, emotion judgment, gender discrimination).
(C) MRI scan of the patient’s brain, whose lesion was relatively restricted to the entire amygdala, a very rare lesion
in humans. The two round black regions near the top middle of the image are the lesioned amygdalae. (D)When the
subject was instructed to look at the eyes (“SM eyes”) in a whole face, she could do this, resulting in a remarkable
recovery in ability to recognize the facial expression of fear. The findings show that an apparent role for the amygdala
in processing fearful facial expressions is in fact more abstract, and involves the detection and attentional direction
onto features that are socially informative. Modified from Ref. 162. Copyright acknowledgment: reproduced from
Ref. 162 with permission from Nature Publishing Group.
fear conditioning22). They are milder than the im-
pairments seenwith bilateral amygdala damage,23,24
as would be expected, and there is some indication
that damage to the right amygdala may disrupt as-
pects of social cognition more than damage to the
left amygdala.25
A second possible cause of amygdala lesions in
humans is encephalitis, which can result in large
bitemporal lesions approaching those made by Klu-
ver and Bucy in monkeys. Patients with such lesions
do show severe impairments in processing emo-
tional and social information,26,27 althoughnot gen-
erally to the degree that Kluver and Bucy observed
in monkeys, and like Kluver and Bucy’s studies they
suffer the same nonspecificity of the lesion to the
amygdala.
The most specific bilateral lesions of the amyg-
dala result from very rare constellations of dam-
age (e.g ., a combination of neurosurgical and/or
vascular28,29) or from Urbach-Wiethe disease.30,31
Urbach-Wiethe disease, also called lipoid pro-
teinosis, is an extremely rare genetic disease,32,33 al-
thougha few studieswith samples of 10ormore sub-
jects have now been published.34,35 We have studied
in detail a patient, SM, who has complete bilat-
eral amygdala lesions due to Urbach-Wiethe disease
(Fig. 3) withminimal damage to surrounding struc-
tures and with IQ in the low normal range.36 She
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Table 1. Summary of findings from subject SM
Impaired in recognizing fear from static facial expressions38
Gives abnormally low ratings of intensity to fearful faces147
Impaired conditioned autonomic responses in Pavlovian fear conditioning 148
Impaired emotional modulation of declarative memory149
Abnormally positive judgments of trustworthiness and approachability from faces150
Cannot judge arousal in negatively valenced stimuli151
Abnormally positive preferences for abstract visual stimuli152
Can discriminate between emotions normally153
Can recognize fear from voice prosody154 but not music 155
Impaired in the Baron-Cohen eyes task156
Less impaired in recognizing emotions in scenes when faces are erased157
Mildly impaired also in recognizing sadness, but not happiness158
Impaired in fixating and using information from the eye region of faces55
Impaired emotional memory for gist but not details159
Lack of experience of negatively valenced emotions in real life125
Fixates the mouth instead of the eyes in conversations with real people160
Has diminished BOLD signal in medial prefrontal cortex during reward expectancy106
Can recognize fear from body posture and pointlight walkers161
Lacks a sense of personal space37
Performs normally on rapid detection and nonconscious processing of fear faces54
is a 43-year-old woman with a high-school educa-
tion whose lesions encompass the entire amygdala
plus subjacent white matter and anterior entorhinal
cortex. This lesion was likely developmental; al-
though the precise age at which it was acquired is
unknown, it is likely to have occurred sometime in
childhood or adolescence, and it is possible that it
was congenital. A series of studies in this patient
has documented a remarkably specific impairment
in recognizing fear from facial expressions, together
with impairments in a variety of social judgments
from faces, discussed in more detail in the next sec-
tion (see Table 1 for a summary).
With respect to social behavior, SM is notably dis-
inhibited and shows a propensity to approach and
engage with others that has occasionally resulted in
social difficulties in real life.36 Although her social
behavior and social decision-making appears some-
what abnormal, and in the same direction as what
one might hypothesize on the basis of the lesion
studies in monkeys reviewed earlier, this is difficult
to quantify.We recently undertook a first laboratory
study to quantify aspects of her social behavior to-
ward others.37 In this study, we asked participants to
indicate their preferred distance in standing facing
an experimenter, together with rating their feeling
of uncomfortableness when this preferred distance
was narrowed and their personal space was violated.
Although there is of course considerable contextual
and individual variation in interpersonal distance
in real life, the distances obtained in our labora-
tory context were remarkably consistent and hov-
ered around 0.6 m with a long-tailed distribution.
When people were approached close to 0.4 m, we
reliably encountered the wall of personal space. By
contrast, SM appeared to have no feeling of personal
space whatsoever: her mean preferred interpersonal
distance in this experiment was smaller than that
of any control subject, she occasionally walked all
the way up to touching the experimenter, and in all
circumstances endorsed no feeling of uncomfort-
ableness when personal space was violated (Fig. 2).
These findings in humans with amygdala lesions
bear some resemblance to what we saw in mon-
keys with bilateral amygdala lesions earlier: a lack
of the normal cautionary brake on behavior with
an increase in approach and prosocial behaviors
(Fig. 2). It is also consistent with a broader func-
tion for the amygdala in processing salient or rel-
evant stimuli, perhaps especially when these signal
unpredictability or potential threat, a function re-
viewed in more detail later. It is noteworthy that
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subject SM still appears to have rank-ordering of
interest in other people: she is not completely in-
discriminate in putting an equal value on every-
one. For instance, she exhibits concern andmaternal
emotions toward her children. Interestingly, female
monkeys with neonatal amygdala lesions have a no-
tably reduced interest in infantmonkeys, suggesting
that aspects of maternal behavior in monkeys are
disrupted.19
Processing information from faces
The initial finding that bilateral lesions to the hu-
man amygdala impair recognition of emotion from
facial expressions38,39 was quickly followed up with
functional imaging using PET40 and has since then
spawned a veritable industry of fMRI studies inves-
tigating responses to faces and other social stimuli
(see Ref. 4 for a sampling). The results from the neu-
roimaging studies have been complex and to some
extent inconsistent. Although earlier studies found
evidence that the amygdala respondedmore to fear-
ful faces than expressions of other emotions,40 more
recent studies support the idea that the amygdala re-
sponds to all faces,41 perhaps especially on the left
side,42 and with complex modulations depending
on their social meaning for a particular individual
in a particular context.43,44 There are nowmany ex-
amples of large individual differences in amygdala
responses to faces, differences that have been tied
to differences in gender,45 in mood and personality
(ranging from anxiety46 to extraversion47), as well
as in genotype.48,49
In the patient with bilateral lesions, SM, who was
described earlier, we studied her processing of emo-
tional faces in great detail. Two recent conclusions
have emerged from this work. One is a conclusion
about the stage(s) in processing at which the amyg-
dala might come into play. Based on a number of
prior findings, notably auditory fear conditioning
in rats50 as well as a few neuroimaging studies51
together with a theoretical view,52 it was generally
thought that the amygdala comes into play early in
processing, and therefore participates importantly
in automatic and nonconscious rapid processing of
stimuli that signal danger. Although the amygdala
may still participate to some extent in such a func-
tion, this view ought to be revised in light of several
new findings, as argued elsewhere.53 The amygdala’s
role appears to bemuch broader than the older view
would suggest, and seems unlikely to be restricted to
processing only stimuli related to threat or danger.
It also appears to be inessential for many aspects of
rapid and nonconscious processing of such stimuli.
One recent study in subject SM demonstrated this
latter finding: SM showed a normal ability to detect
fearful faces in visual search or rapid discrimination,
and a normal ability for fearful faces to overcome
binocular suppression that would render themnon-
conscious.54 These findings do not rule out some
role for the amygdala in rapid and nonconscious
processing related to orienting, but together with
other findings they shift the view toward a more
modulatory, temporally extended role for the amyg-
dala in perception and recognition. They also shift
the anatomical substrate of processing away from
a subcortical route of visual input to the amygdala
via the superior colliculus and pulvinar thalamus to
amygdalo-cortical interactions.
A second broad conclusion from findings in sub-
ject SM and from other recent studies has been the
idea that the amygdala allocatesprocessing resources
(such as attention) to salient stimuli, or features
within stimuli. In regard to SM’s impaired recogni-
tion of fear from facial expressions, this appears to
arise from her inability to make spontaneous use of
information from the eye region of faces: she fails
to direct her gaze toward this region in faces, fails
to benefit from it when it is shown in isolation,
and improves when instructed to fixate the eye re-
gion (Fig. 3).55 When shown sparsely sampled faces
(using a method called “bubbles”56 to reveal only
small random parts of an underlying face), people
normally benefit from having the eyes in the face
revealed when they are asked to discriminate fear
from other emotions,57 but SM shows no such ben-
efit. SM also generally does not fixate the eyes in
faces (either in whole faces or in the bubbles faces),
in many cases staring straight at the center of the
face without moving her eyes over the face at all.
Yet she is able to make use of the eye region of faces
to help her discriminate fear when her visual at-
tention is explicitly directed toward the eyes. These
findings fit with a role for the amygdala in vigilance,
ambiguity resolution, and uncertainty resolution:
it modulates other brain structures to enhance the
processingof stimuli aboutwhichmore information
needs to be acquired.58,59 Both of the earlier findings
are in line with the idea that the amygdala modu-
lates cortical processing to implement selectivity for
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biologically relevant stimuli, just as it does, for
example, in modulating hippocampal-dependent
memory consolidation.60
The amygdala’s role in processing information
about the eye region of faces, put together with
its presumptive function in disambiguating stim-
uli, has been borne out also by two recent func-
tional neuroimaging studies (Fig. 4). One study61
showed subjects’ fearful faces (as well as neu-
tral, happy, and angry faces) briefly presented at
locations where the preceding fixation cross either
coincided with the eye region of faces, or with the
mouth region of faces. The authors then collected
BOLD signal from the amygdala and also measured
eye movements. When the data were analyzed with
the direction of the eye movement as a regressor
(either moving down toward the mouth when the
eyes had been fixated, or up toward the eyes when
the mouth had been fixated), a significant effect
was found in the amygdala specifically to fear faces
(Fig. 4, left). The effect amounted to a significant
correlation between BOLD signal evoked in the
amygdala and the propensity to direct gaze to the
eye region of the face when the mouth had been
fixated initially. These findings provide strong sup-
port for the idea that the amygdala serves to di-
rect gaze toward the eyes in fearful faces to obtain
disambiguating information. Another fMRI study
found that the amygdala was differentially activated
by fearful compared to neutral faces even when the
eye region of the face was masked62 (Fig. 4, right),
also consistent with the idea that the amygdala is
not necessarily responding to the eyes as such, but
rather directing processing resources toward disam-
biguating that region of the face to figure out its so-
cial meaning (a mechanism that could engage even
more so when the eyes are covered in an attempt
to glean whatever information possible from that
region).
There are several remaining puzzles about the
type of visual information processed by the amyg-
dala. A subcortical route of input would put empha-
sis on low spatial frequencies; yet patient SM has
impairments rather selective for high spatial fre-
quencies. Some fMRI studies have suggested that
low spatial-frequency information is most effec-
tive in driving the amygdala,63 whereas others have
found evidence for both high and low spatial fre-
quency.64 In the case of our studies with SM on the
bubbles task, the data are quite specific in show-
ing that she fails to make use selectively of high
spatial-frequency information from the eyes while
low spatial frequencies are preserved. The relation-
ship between visual fields and amygdala response
is also somewhat puzzling. Some human fMRI
studies have now provided evidence that amyg-
dala activation correlates better with presentation of
salient stimuli in the ipsilateral visual field,65 and we
have preliminary findings that unilateral amygdala
lesions impair processing of the eye region shown
on the side of the stimulus face that is ipsilateral to
the side of the lesion.
The amygdala codes salience or relevance
The earlier notion that the amygdalamay be special-
ized for fear-related processing and later ideas that
it comes into play when stimuli are unpredictable or
ambiguous have a related theme: both situations in-
volve a need to gather additional information from
the environment. The physiology of facial expres-
sions of fear is such that they maximize visual and
olfactory intake of information—adaptive in cir-
cumstances where an unknown potential predator
needs to be detected.66 Yet it has been elusive to
quantify this aspect of information processing in
terms of a single parameter or psychological dimen-
sion. It does not neatly fit the concept of “arousal”
if by that one means autonomic arousal as clas-
sically conceived; however, it could be related to
a more information-processing concept of arousal
that construes it as interruption of ongoing process-
ing to gather new information (more aligned with
orienting).
There have been hints for some time that the
amygdala must process a stimulus dimension that
is more abstract than the traditional concepts of va-
lence or arousal alone. Several studies have found
that the amygdala is activated by both negatively as
well as positively valenced stimuli,67 leading to the
common view that it tracks emotional arousal (and
that prior claims about specialization for fear, threat,
or negative valence were simply derivative to the
higher arousal of such stimulus categories).68 This
emphasis on the amygdala as processing arousal also
fit with a view that emerged from the literature on
emotional memory.69 However, this looks unlikely
to be the final story. One study investigating the
intensity and valence of odorants argued that a con-
junction of valence and intensity (in those studies
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Figure 4. The amygdala helps direct gaze to eyes in faces. Left: data from an fMRI study that plots the response in
the amygdala as a function of how often people shift their gaze from the mouth up to the eyes.61 The amygdala is
not activated so much as a consequence of fixating the eyes, but rather in preparation for fixating the eyes. A similar
conclusion was obtained in another fMRI study, which found equivalent amygdala activation to fear faces even when
the eye region itself was erased (right).62 Copyright acknowledgment: reproduced fromRef. 61 with permission from
the Society for Neuroscience (left), and from Ref. 62 with permission from Elsevier (right).
a proxy for arousal) may be what the amygdala
cares about: stimuli that are both arousing/intense
and emotional (either positively or negatively va-
lenced).70 Another study found amygdala activation
not only to both negatively and positive-valenced
stimuli of high arousal, but also to stimuli that were
not so much arousing as they were interesting or
bizarre.71 It is difficult to know from these stud-
ies what psychological construct would best capture
whatever it is that is engaging the amygdala.
One study explicitly investigated psychological
dimensions other than “arousal” or “valence,” and
found that even when these were held relatively in-
variant, the amygdala showed a further differential
activation as a function of “impact,”72 the subjective
significance or relevance of a stimulus. Although
this construct is correlated with arousal, it is not
perfectly correlated. This finding is consistent with
some other attempts to assign to the amygdala a
more abstract and ecological role in processing “rel-
evance,” a concept frompsychological appraisal the-
ory that stresses the contextual and goal-dependent
value of a stimulus within a personal situation.73,74
Constructs such as impact and relevance also pave
the way for investigating individual differences in
amygdala function, because they are patently sub-
jective and dependent on each person’s contextual
interpretation of a stimulus in the sense that they
are individual rather than entirely universal.
Several electrophysiological studies in both hu-
mans and monkeys have led to a conceptually par-
allel view: on the one hand, the amygdala appears
to respond to a broad class of social stimuli and
to reward value or arousal as such; on the other
hand, neurons within it can show highly selective
responses to specific social stimuli that are relevant
for that person or monkey. In monkeys, electro-
physiological responses in the amygdala have been
found that precede skin-conductance responses,75
a ubiquitous index of orienting and arousal that
can be elicited by any salient or novel stimulus. A
number of recordings from the amygdala and ad-
jacent cortex in monkeys have found responses to
faces76,77 and to other complex social stimuli,78 in
several cases showing selectivity for identity, emo-
tion, or social status of the stimulus. Several recent
50 Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1191 (2010) 42–61 c© 2010 New York Academy of Sciences.
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studies have also investigated responses to reward
value. In humans, responses to emotional faces79
and complex social scenes80 have been recorded
from depth electrodes in the amygdala in neuro-
surgical patients, and some categorical coding to
emotions such as threat or disgust have been ex-
tracted.80 Highly selective and abstract responses to
the identity of specific people have also been found
at the single-unit level—in some cases with gen-
eralizability across viewpoints, kinds of depictions
(photos or caricatures), and evenwhether the image
is a photo or the written name of a famous person.81
It should be noted, however, that such responses are
not unique to the amygdala, and similar response
profiles are often encountered in nearby cortex and
hippocampus.
It would be useful to probe the amygdala’s re-
sponse on a battery of heterogeneous stimuli that
span a range of saliency or relevance to test the
hypothesis that these dimensions are what is driv-
ing the amygdala. Although no such study has yet
been undertaken, there is evidence to support this
prediction from the tasks so far: the amygdala is
activated by salient images including faces, by in-
creasing amplitudes of sound (arguably an auditory
analog of the most salient visual stimulus type, op-
tic flow to signal collision),82 and even by cognitive
indicators of saliency such as the mere belief that
another person is approaching to stand close, when
that person cannot actually be seen.37 The related
concepts of unpredictability and ambiguity seem to
be two potential underlying (but perhaps not ex-
haustive) factors that could influence saliency and
hence the amygdala. Ambiguity aversion in mon-
etary gambles (i.e., gambling when the risks are
unknown and uncertainty is therefore highest) is
correlatedwithamygdala activation.83 Amygdala ac-
tivation in humans, as well as electrophysiological
responseswithin the amygdala in rodents, have been
linked to temporal unpredictability in sequences of
auditory stimuli.84 In this latter study, a potential
cellular mechanism was suggested: temporally un-
predictable stimuli result in less habituation of
amygdala responses. This differential habituation,
together with a generally rapid habituation to stim-
uli that have become predictable and hence less
salient in some way,85 may underlie some of the
amygdala’s response to novel and unpredictable
stimuli. Taken together, the recent studies point to-
ward a revised view of the type of stimulus cat-
egory, and the kind of psychological dimension,
that the amygdala helps process. The challenge now
is to translate these constructs into a computa-
tional framework that would allow one to formu-
late parametrically quantitative hypotheses. Here,
approaches from reinforcement learning and neu-
roeconomics may help, a topic we briefly review
next.
The amygdala in reward learning
There is a huge and well-known literature on fear
conditioning and the amygdala, mostly from work
in rodents. This has shown that the amygdala is
necessary for at least some and possibly all aspects
of fear conditioning,86 that prominently the lateral
as well as the central nucleus87 are the key compo-
nents, and that specific subpopulations of neurons
within the amygdala can be identified as a possible
neuronal substrate.88 There is still plenty of debate
about details in this picture. But there are now an
ever-growing number of studies that examine the
amygdala’s role in processing stimulus value in a
much broader way than only fear conditioning.
Ever since earlier lesion studies showing that the
amygdala plays a role in appetitive as well as aver-
sive conditioning, evidence has been accumulating
that linking the amygdala to “fear” is too simple
a story. There is now a substantial literature from
electrophysiological studies in animals showing that
amygdala neurons respond both to rewarding and
punishing stimuli or their predictors. In fact, there
is a bewildering variety of neuronal response types
in the amygdala, with neurons that encode rewards
intermixed with those coding punishment and no
apparent evidence of any segregation or topogra-
phy.89 Some neurons respond both to aversive and
rewarding conditioned stimuli,90 suggesting a more
abstract coding of predictors for emotional arousal
or saliency. In general, the lesion and electrophys-
iology literature from studies in animals has made
a strong argument that the amygdala codes the ab-
stract reward value of stimuli or their predictors,
rather than their sensory properties or the partic-
ular instrumental actions required for obtaining or
avoiding them.91 This has led to the view that the
amygdala codes a continuously updated and flex-
ibly deployed representation of stimulus value.92
Somewhat at odds with such a role in abstract
value representations are other electrophysiological
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studies in both human81,93 and nonhuman77 ani-
mals that argue there is also coding for stimulus
identity. Plausibly, the conjunction of a dynamic
coding of stimulus value together with coding stim-
ulus identity would serve a key role in social be-
havior: the need to keep track of the social value of
conspecifics through time.
Although the amygdala appears essential for
Pavlovian fear conditioning and is clearly involved
in reward learning, this latter role is nuanced. There
are many tasks that ostensibly involve aspects of re-
ward learning for which complete bilateral lesions
of the amygdala, if selective, result in essentially no
impairment.94,95 This revision is reminiscent of how
our picture of the amygdala’s role in social behavior
has evolved from early highly nonselective ablation
studies through selective ibotenate lesions in mod-
ern day. What selective ibotenic acid lesions of the
amygdala do seem to impair is learning in tasks
where information about stimulus value is essen-
tial, such as in devaluation studies.92 In such stud-
ies, the animal is asked to choose the exact same
stimulus before and after a devaluation such as sati-
ation, which changes the reward value of the stim-
ulus without changing any of its sensory properties
or associations. These tasks require a flexible up-
dating of the value associated with a stimulus based
on integration of its outcome with the physiological
state of the animal (e.g ., when satiated on a par-
ticular food, that food loses its reward value even
though its sensory properties remain unchanged).
Lesions of the amygdala abolish the change in be-
havior that would indicate that the reward value
of the stimulus has been updated by the satia-
tion, suggesting the amygdala is critical to maintain
current representations of reward value—a conclu-
sion in line also with functional imaging studies in
humans.96
The importance of context and of individual dif-
ferences is emerging in studies of reward learning
and decision-making as well. One example has been
highlighted in a study that examined the so-called
framing effect from economics.97 In this study, par-
ticipants were first given some money, and then
asked to choose between two options. One option
was to keep a fixed amount of this money (say, $20
out of an initial endowment of $50); the other op-
tion was to gamble with some probability of keep-
ing or losing all of the initial endowment (say, 2/5
chance of keeping all of it and 3/5 chance of losing
all of it). Importantly, the expected value of the sure
amount and the gamble were identical. The trick in
this study was that the sure amount was presented
in two frames: a “loss frame” in which it was de-
scribed as “you lose $30 of your original $50,” and a
“gain frame” in which it was described as “you win
$20 of your original $50.” This resulted in a well-
known effect from economics called the framing
effect; subjects chose the gamble with the positive
frame over the one with the negative frame, even
though both state the same outcome. This fram-
ing effect correlated profoundly with activation of
the amygdala. Moreover, there were substantial in-
dividual differences on the task and in brain activa-
tion. This story has recently been linked to genetic
variation in the serotonin reuptake transporter as
well98 (a polymorphismwith a rapidly growing liter-
ature linking it to individual differences in amygdala
response99).
These findings from the reward learning litera-
ture, which have only been reviewed very briefly
here, complement the studies on face processing and
social behavior, which also emphasize the highly dy-
namic and context-sensitive role that the amygdala
must play in evaluating stimuli. For instance, the ac-
tual task of judging the positive or negative qualities
of famous faces strongly modulates amygdala acti-
vation to those faces100; and the mere assignment
to a social group in an experiment is sufficient to
drive amygdala responses to faces that discriminate
people within one’s assigned experimental group
from those outside the group.101 Taken together,
the reward learning and social neuroscience litera-
ture hold out promise to provide a computational
framework in which amygdala function could be
formally modeled. Such a framework would be ex-
pected to draw from neuroeconomics and decision
science andmight provide a unified view of what are
now a huge number of somewhat disparate findings
on the amygdala’s role in social cognition. That view
would articulate the amygdala’s role in integrating
internal and external sensory signals to continu-
ously monitor the physiological value of a stimulus,
and it would play this role also extended to complex
social stimuli. However, a complete model of such a
function requires we consider what other structures
interact with the amygdala, and what regions of the
brain might receive signals from the amygdala that
can be used to implement aspects of cognition and
behavior.
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Interaction with other structures
Investigating the amygdala’s interaction with other
structures as a component of a network for process-
ing the reward value of stimuli is a currently hot
topic. Who are the other players? Highlighted have
been the orbitofrontal cortex and other sectors of
the prefrontal cortex, the striatum, and the nucleus
accumbens.102 Lesions that disconnect the amygdala
with some of these structures have documented the
importance of their interaction. For instance, dis-
connection of the amygdala and orbitofrontal cor-
tex results in deficits on reward learning tasks as
severe as lesions to either structure in isolation.103
Similarly, disconnection of the amygdala from the
nucleus accumbens disrupts instrumental behavior
toward rewards.104 A technically and conceptually
challenging issue concerns the order in processing
at which different structures come into play. The
issue is technically difficult because it generally re-
quires concurrent electrophysiological recording; it
is conceptually challenging because the structures
are reciprocally connected and participate in pro-
cessing over some extended duration that would
permit multiple iterations of feedback. Nonethe-
less, some headway has been made even here. For
instance, in the aforementioned interactionbetween
amygdala and nucleus accumbens, there is evidence
that the amygdala can come into play early and con-
vey information about particular sensory cues to the
nucleus accumbens to guide instrumental behavior.
A similar story has been proposed from lesion stud-
ies of the amygdala in humans: one study reported
a lack of loss aversion following amygdala lesions,
interpreted as an amygdala-dependent signal that
was passed to the striatum105; another study found
reduced signal related to reward prediction in the
prefrontal cortex when the amygdala was lesioned,
a finding also interpreted as evidence for a reward-
related signal that would normally be passed from
the amygdala to the prefrontal cortex to guide be-
havioral choice.106 In all these cases, the actual route
of information transfer is unknown: for instance, it
appears likely that the amygdala influences the pre-
frontal cortex both through a strongly driving indi-
rect route via the dorsomedial thalamus as well as a
direct but diffuselymodulatory input107 (somewhat
the converse of what one might have guessed intu-
itively). Electrophysiological recordings fromamyg-
dala and orbitofrontal cortex in rats bear out this
overall picture: the amygdala acquires the requisite
associations related to the current reward value of
a stimulus, and the orbitofrontal cortex uses this
signal to guide choice,108 a finding consistent with
human fMRI data as well.106 An important future
direction will be to dissect in detail how processing
between the two structures evolves in time during
the decision-making process.
In terms of sensory inputs to the amygdala, these
hail from all sensory modalities, including intero-
ceptive information thatwould include information
about internal states such as hunger or satiety. In re-
gard to vision, the primate amygdala receives strong
inputs from anterior temporal neocortex; there is
also a hypothesized subcortical route of visual input
that, as we noted above, is both anatomically and
functionally unclear.53 It has been known for some
time that the connections of the amygdala with vi-
sual cortices show both reciprocal and nonrecipro-
cal feedback projections from the basal amygdala to
all regions of visual cortex in the temporal lobe, and
indeed all the way back to primary visual cortex in
the occipital lobe (a finding so far documented only
in monkeys109 and cats110). The functional signifi-
cance of this feedback architecture remains unclear,
although it has been shown to modulate process-
ing in temporal cortex of emotional facial expres-
sions111 andmayplay a role particularly in conscious
evaluation of such stimuli.112 The sensory inputs
to the amygdala are gated by at least two mecha-
nisms. One is a dopamine-mediated enhancement
of sensory inputs to the amygdala; a second is a
prefrontal-mediated inhibition via projections from
the prefrontal cortex.113 Both of these mechanisms
show individual differences, which may be corre-
lated substantially with individual differences re-
lated to mood.114 The connections between amyg-
dala and the prefrontal cortex in particular have
been highlighted in regard to genetic polymor-
phisms and susceptibility to psychiatric illness.115
Of great interest has been a polymorphism in the
promotor region of the serotonin reuptake trans-
porter (5HTTLPR), which is associated with risk of
depression, as well as with changes in BOLD signal
within the amygdala while processing emotional fa-
cial expressions99 in humans, and associated with
individual differences in anxious temperament and
scanpaths to faces in monkeys.116 More recently, a
number of studies have found that the polymor-
phism is associated also with systematic changes in
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the strength of both structural and functional con-
nectivity between amygdala and medial parts of the
prefrontal cortex,49,117 with consequences for psy-
chopathology,49 trait anxiety,118 aswell as for aspects
of decision making that take into account context
and framing effects we discussed earlier.98 There are
also well-known projections from the amygdala to
the nucleus accumbens to modulate dopaminergic
responses related to reward learning. In fact, the
basolateral amygdala together with prefrontal cor-
tex appear essential to provide such dopaminergic
neurons with stimulus and context-related infor-
mation that can be used to predict reward,119,120
emphasizing the tight relationship between amyg-
dala, prefrontal cortex, and ventral striatum in re-
ward learning.
The amygdala projects to a host of other struc-
tures (see Ref. 1 for review), and the functional con-
sequences of these projections remain to be fully
understood. In addition to the projections to com-
ponents of the basal ganglia that influence instru-
mental learning and choice, and to the prefrontal
cortex to modulate decision making as noted ear-
lier, the amygdala also projects to structures such
as the hippocampus to modulate consolidation of
emotional declarative memories, to the basal fore-
brain to modulate attention and other aspects of
memory, and to the retrosplenial cortex121 where
it may influence self-directed versus externally di-
rected attention. All of these connections can likely
be understood at least in part as a modulation that
provides some kind of processing selectivity based
on value, saliency, and relevance. It is likely that
such modulation takes place at multiple tempo-
ral scales, ranging from long-term trait-like effects
to moment-by-moment effects on specific items
encountered.122
Future directions
One big open question concerns the amygdala’s role
in the conscious experience of emotion and moti-
vation. Although functional imaging studies gen-
erally have supported such a role correlatively, few
have investigated it explicitly. One study found a
correlation between real-life emotional experience
and the magnitude of amygdala activation to visual
stimuli.123 Yet a lesion study argued that the amyg-
dala was inessential for the experience of fear,124
although this was based on a limited questionnaire
measure. We have examined the issue to some ex-
tent in subject SM as well, who on clinical interview
comes across as having an abnormally low level of
negative emotions in her experience.125 The topic
remains to be explored with a detailed, rich battery
of probes including realistic elicitors of strong emo-
tions like fear—something ethically difficult to do
in humans.
A technically challenging question concerns the
temporal dynamics of when the amygdala comes
into play during information processing, and how
it does so in interaction with other structures such
as the prefrontal cortex and striatum, a topic we
hinted at earlier. The theme of context-dependent
amygdala evaluation of stimuli as part of evaluating
the relevance of stimuli fits also within certain psy-
chological appraisal theories that incorporate time
as an explicit dimension of interest. For instance,
Klaus Scherer’s component-process framework to
emotion posits a number of temporally and infor-
mationally sequential “stimulus evaluation checks”
that correspond to degrees of evaluation and disam-
biguation.126 Which of these relies on the amygdala?
This question finds some parallel to questions about
whether the amygdala subserves rapid, coarse, pre-
attentive processing or slower, more fine-grained
processing that should be considered fully “cog-
nitive” (a neuroanatomical equivalent of a long
historical debate about the primacy of emotion and
cognition within psychology127,128). Such levels of
processing are not always carefully distinguished
from the point in time atwhich they unfold, twodis-
tinct issues. Related to the temporal dynamics issue
is the topic of amygdala habituation, of interest both
mechanistically and in terms of relevance to psychi-
atric illness. The emerging view of the amygdala’s
role in many psychiatric disorders is that it is not
modulated or habituated appropriately, resulting in
exaggerated or context-inappropriate amygdala re-
sponses in those disorders. For instance, there is re-
cent evidence from studies in autism that the amyg-
dala fails to habituate to the sight of faces.129 Clearly,
better tools to measure neuroanatomical engage-
ment with millisecond accuracy will help tremen-
dously in mapping out precisely which processes
the amygdala contributes to; right now we are gen-
erally blurring with a very wide temporal window.
The ever-increasing number of electrophysiological
studies of the human amygdala in surgical patients
holds out great promise for tackling this issue.
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A final topic of great current interest is the amyg-
dala’s role in development as well as aging (see
Box 2). The amygdala has been implicated in de-
velopmental disorders and undergoes substantial
changes in morphometry throughout adolescence,
in both human130,131 and nonhuman animals.132
There is some evidence this developmental trajec-
tory is altered in autism, even though the adult vol-
umemay be normal.133 We briefly noted earlier that
the consequences of amygdala lesions in monkeys
canbequite different if the lesions aremade in adult-
hood or neonatally134 and that subject SMmay have
amygdala lesions best described as developmental.
Box 2: The amygdala in development
Structural changes in the amygdala are evident
throughout adolescence in both human and non-
human animals.130–132 In parallel with struc-
tural development, there are important functional
changes in emotional behaviors thought to depend
on the amygdala. From early adolescence (4 weeks
old) through early adulthood (8 weeks old), mice
show a variety of changes in emotional responsiv-
ity.139 Pavlovian fear conditioning is more gener-
alized140 and enhanced139 in early adolescence as
compared to early adulthood, a change that ap-
pears to arise mostly from an increased plasticity
within synapses arising from the thalamus in the
younger mice.141 Findings in even younger rodents
have shown that 3-week-old rats completely erase
conditioned fear after extinction,142 whereas adult
animals have long been known to show sponta-
neous recovery and reinstatement, a phenomenon
of great interest also to understanding traumatic
memories in humans. The long-termnature of fear
memories appears to depend in particular on the
basolateral amygdala.143 Very young rat pups have
shown that fear conditioning can even lead to op-
posite behavioral effects from those seen in adults:
10-day-old rat pups are attracted to odors asso-
ciated with shock, unlike the normal behavioral
avoidance seen in older animals. This surprising
effect depends on differences in release of gluco-
corticoids and dopamine release within the amyg-
dala, and it has been speculated that it evolved to
mediate unconditional attachment in altricial an-
imals where the young are helpless.144 There are
also substantial differences in amygdala-mediated
behaviors between infant and older monkeys,134
as well as differences during development in hu-
mans.145,146 All of these findings stress the need to
take into account changing socio-emotional func-
tions throughout the lifespan.
Related to this topic is the question of which as-
pects of value and saliency might be coded in the
amygdala already at birth, and which are acquired
through experience—and how easily they can be
extinguished or changed, a very important topic
for understanding disorders such as posttraumatic
stress syndrome or phobias that can be remarkably
resistant to extinction.
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